To dismiss any notion that the division was permanent, a final declaration not supported in Article 6 states: “The Conference recognizes that the essential objective of the Vietnam Agreement is to resolve military matters with a view to ending hostilities, and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should in no way be interpreted as a political or territorial border.”  A few days later, the sixth plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam took place. Ho Chi Minh and Secretary General Trường Chinh took turns stressing the need for a quick political solution to prevent a military intervention by the United States, which is now Vietnam`s “main and direct enemy.” “In the new situation, we can`t follow the old program,” Ho said. “Our motto was: `War of resistance until victory`. Now, in the face of the new situation, we must defend a new motto: peace, unification, independence and democracy. A spirit of compromise would be necessary on the part of both parties to make the negotiations a success, and there can no longer be any question of annihilating and annihilating all french troops. A demarcation line allowing a temporary regrouping of the two sides would be necessary. The plenum endorsed Ho`s analysis and passed a resolution supporting a compromise solution to end the fighting. Ho and Truong Chinh, however, apparently feared that such an agreement in Geneva would lead to internal discontent and a “left-wing deviation,” and analysts in particular would not acknowledge the complexity of the situation and underestimate the power of American and French adversaries. As a result, they reminded their colleagues that France would retain control of much of the country and that people living in the region could be confused, alienated and susceptible to hostile manipulations.
Dulles fell out with British delegate Anthony Eden over the UK`s perceived failure to support joint action and US positions on Indochina; he left Geneva on 3 May and was replaced by his deputy, Walter Bedell Smith. :555-8 The State of Vietnam refused to participate in the negotiations until Bidault wrote to Bảo Đại, assuring him that any agreement would not divide Vietnam. :550–1 Diplomats from South Korea, North Korea, the People`s Republic of China (PRC), the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America (USA) discussed the Korean side of the conference. For the Indochinese side, there were agreements between France, the Viet Minh, the USSR, the PRC, the United States, the United Kingdom and the future states made up of French`Indochina.  The agreement temporarily divides Vietnam into two zones, a northern zone that will be governed by the Viet Minh and a southern zone governed by the State of Vietnam, then ruled by former Emperor Bảo Đại. A final declaration of the conference, issued by the British president of the conference, stipulated that general elections should be held by July 1956 in order to create a united Vietnamese state. Although they contributed to the creation of the agreements, they were not directly signed or accepted by the delegates of the State of Vietnam and the United States, and the State of Vietnam subsequently refused to allow the elections, which led to the Vietnam War the following year. Three separate ceasefire agreements covering Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were signed at the conference. The British and Chinese Communist delegations agreed on the sidelines of the conference to strengthen their diplomatic relations.  The agreement was signed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, France, the People`s Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. The State of Vietnam rejected the agreement, while the US said it “takes note” of the ceasefire agreements and says it “will refrain from threatening or using force to disrupt them.” :606 All parties in the conference called for reunification elections, but could not agree on the details.